Just before the midnight deadline on Friday, August 3, 2007, California Secretary of State Debra Bowen, as a result of the “top-to-bottom” review of electronic voting systems in California that she had ordered, de-certified those manufactured by Diebold Election Systems and Sequoia Voting Systems, which were otherwise going to be used by millions of voters in Riverside, San Bernardino, San Diego and Ventura Counties during the three statewide elections, including a crucial February 5, 2008, presidential primary, scheduled for 2008.
On Monday, August 20, 2007,
Etopia Voting News submitted a set of four questions to Mr. Bryan Whitener, spokesperson for the Election Assistance Commission (EAC), to get that agency’s views on the implications of this de-certification for voting in the U.S. generally and, more specifically, for the further disbursement of federal HAVA (Help America Vote Act) funds to pay for these expensive and now, in California at least, de-certified systems.
On August 22, 2007, EAC spokesperson Whitener sent these responses to the four
Etopia Voting News questions:
(1) How much HAVA money has so far been disbursed for DRE machines and other electronic voting systems?
The following press release on EAC's report to Congress includes this information and more. It also links to the detailed report containing charts and figures for each state, including money received and spent. Please see the following:
07/31.07 - EAC Releases Report on HAVA Spending by States
(2) How much HAVA money remains to be spent, and where is that money now?
See answer above.
(3) Please comment on the impact in California and nationwide of California Secretary of State Debra Bowen's recent decision to de-certify major DRE systems.
We applaud California’s efforts to focus on voting system security, as well as conducting these activities transparently. Certainly election officials throughout the country are paying close attention to the situation to see if there are components or findings that are applicable to their jurisdictions.
What works in one state may not necessarily apply to all states. [bolding added] Each state and many jurisdictions within a state have different needs -- one size does not fit all in elections. Requirements are driven by the voting system, the software, and local laws.
It’s also important to remember that to ensure secure and accurate elections; you must focus not only on the voting system, but the management of that system. And California included in its findings many management recommendations as well because to successfully hack into ANY voting system -- ballot box, op-scan or touch screen -- on Election Day, you need two things: access to and knowledge of the voting system. Physical security and the human element must both be evaluated to ensure secure elections. Physical security is only half of the equation. The system must be physically protected, employees and poll workers must be trained, and security procedures must be put in place throughout the process. EAC has issued management guidelines to help election officials put these kinds of procedures in place. We cover issues like introducing a new voting system, voting system security, ballot design, poll worker training, and logic and accuracy testing. It is also important to let the public observe the entire process.
(4) Might any HAVA money be used to supplement REAL ID expenditures in terms of providing secure ID to promote secure voting?
These funds must be used to comply with the provisions of HAVA. For more information, please see the following:
Permissible Uses of HAVA Funds Made Available to States.
